A question appeared on a list serve this weekend about productivity measures and incentive pay. Aaaarrrrgggghhhhh! This concept has broadly infected academic “primary care” practices. Here is the concept. The MGMA publishes averages for the daily, weekly or monthly billing of internists and family physicians.  Administrators use these averages (or even the 75th percentile) as targets for academic physicians.  So academic physicians have a target of seeing a certain number of patients (with minor adjustment for complexity and new patient visits.)

I assume that administrators use these targets to stimulate the physicians to work hard. The targets are like any other measurement.  As we focus on the 50th or 75th percentile, we note that the target increases each year.  Thus, we cannot all remain like the children of Lake Wobegon.

Why do we set arbitrary statistical targets?  These targets negatively influence physicians, encouraging them to spend less time with each patient.  Many physicians use their “academic” time to support their clinical time (allowing for incentive pay.)  When the measurement becomes the issue, then other important components of ones job suffers.  Given a zero-sum time game, more time devoted to seeing patients (here I refer to the time spent when one is not scheduled for clinic) means less time for teaching, scholarly activity, administrative duties and even reading.

Academic medicine in 2008 often focuses too much on money.  The heroes are those who bring in grants, or many patients, rather than those who publish important articles (unless those result from the grants) or those who are great teachers.  The pursuit of money is corrupting the academic mission.

But then, does this really surprise anyone?