Pay for Performance in Primary Care in England and California: Comparison of Unintended Consequences
Somehow I missed this one. This article has parallel important analyses.
Unintended consequences reported by physicians varied according to the incentive program. English physicians were much more likely to report that the program changed the nature of the office visit. This change was linked to a larger number of performance measures and heavy reliance on electronic medical records, with computer prompts to facilitate the delivery of performance measures. Californian physicians were more likely to express resentment about pay for performance and appeared less motivated to act on financial incentives, even in the program with the highest rewards. The inability of Californian physicians to exclude individual patients from performance calculations caused frustration, and some physicians reported such undesirable behaviors as forced disenrollment of noncompliant patients. English physicians are assessed using data extracted from their own medical records, whereas in California assessment mostly relies on data collected by multiple third parties that may have different quality targets. Assessing performance based on these data contributes to feelings of resentment, lack of understanding, and lack of ownership reported by Californian physicians.
The use of P4P is, in my opinion, immoral. P4P changes physician behavior, and it is unlikely that that change is an improvement.
The underpinning idea of P4P is that it will improve patient outcomes. We have no evidence that this theory will work. If I introduce a new drug, I must jump through many hoops showing both efficacy and lack of significant harm. The gurus of EBM insist on evidence for treatments and diagnostic tests – and they are right.
We need an outcry about P4P, which has no evidence behind the concept. It is immoral because the predictable unintended consequences are not good for patient care.
Our study findings suggest that unintended consequences of incentive programs relate to the way in which these programs are designed and implemented. Although unintended, these consequences are not necessarily unpredictable. When designing incentive schemes, more attention needs to be paid to factors likely to produce unintended consequences.
Nice study but they clearly do not understand motivation. Incentive schemes are bound to fail. Physicians want to do the right thing for their patients. We can motivate better with incentive schemes. We should ban this practice in the US.
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3 Responses to P4P – predictable consequences
C Dahlin
December 11th, 2009 at 11:29 am
I got back one of my quality evals from Blue Cross. One of the indicators was colonoscopy.The data was two years old. It only went back two years, so it did not include any done in the last five to ten (recommended), nor did it exclude 80 years olds.It included 15 patients out of my over 2,000. It had to specifically call for the names, and by the time they came, it was the before-Christmas-using- up- my- deductible- rush we all see. What a waste of time.I scored 97-98 in mammograms, paps-68 in colonoscopy;right then you would think the generators of data might think-gee, doesn't this look odd?
Pay for performance for me is NOT paying for more paperwork.
Michael Kirsch, M.D.
December 12th, 2009 at 9:39 am
I agree that P4P is a sham. It could be more aptly renamed, Pay for Paperwork instead. The true determinants of medical quality, as in any art, cannot be measured. So, the medical quality enforcers will use a bean counting approach as they gather data that is an inadequate surrogate for true medical quality. They will use parameters that can be easily measured, counted and graphed claiming that this can accurately assess the medical profession. Their pie charts are pie in the sky. http://www.MDWhistleblower.blogspot.com
solo dr
December 12th, 2009 at 7:05 pm
It takes 4 lines of CPT codes to report a diabetic's systolic BP, diastolic BP, A1C, and LDL cholesterol for Medicare's P4P for a massive 2% bonus.
Blue cross sent me ratings for the last 3 years on my patients. Many of my patients need colonoscopies, but they decline when they find out it will eat at least a $1,000 of their individual $2,000 annual deductible. I then get listed as 60-70% of my patients as doing the required test. Same with a dilated eye exam for my diabetics and hypertensives. My office staff can schedule the patient to see an ophthalmologist, but the patients still won't show up and get it done.
I started doing my own lipid panels, A1Cs, and other CLIA waived labs, as about 40% of my patients were not doing their labs. My quality indicators went from the low 60s to above 95% on all my Blue Cross diabetics. A1C numbers also dropped, as I can immediately d/w my patients their glycemic control. I don't get any extra pay or bonuses from the insurance companies for this extra effort.
With Medicare giving my area a 2% bonus and with fewer than 10 Medicare patient's/day, it makes sense simply to use the 20-30 minutes of quality reporting and tracking time/day to see 2 additional patients/day to increase overall revenue.